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SPECIAL ARTICLE
THE CASE FOR THE USE OF ANIMALS IN BIOMEDICAL RESEARCH
CARL COHEN

U

SING animals as research subjects in medical
investigations is widely condemned on two
grounds: first, because it wrongly violates the rights of
animals, 1 and second, because it wrongly imposes on
sentient creatures much avoidable sujfering. 2 Neither
of these arguments is sound. The first relies on a mis
taken understanding of rights; the second relies on a
mistaken calculation of consequences. Both deserve
definitive dismissal.
WHY ANIMALS HAVE No RIGHTS

A right, properly understood, is a claim, or potential
claim, that one party may exercise against another.
The target against whom such a claim may be regis
tered can be a single person, a group, a community, or
(perhaps) all humankind. The content of rights claims
also varies greatly: repayment of loans, nondiscrimi
nation by employers, noninterference by the state, and
so on. To comprehend any genuine right fully, there
fore, we must know who holds the right, against whom it
is held, and to what it is a right.
From the Department of Philosophy of the University of Michigan and the
University of Michigan Medical School, Ann Arbor. Address reprint requests to
Professor Cohen at the Office of the Dean, University of Michigan Medical
School, M7300 Medical Science Building I, Ann Arbor, MI 48109.

Alternative sources of rights add complexity. Some
rights are grounded in constitution and law (e.g., the
right of an accused to trial by jury); some rights are
moral but give no legal claims (e.g., my right to your
keeping the promise you gave me); and some rights
(e.g., against theft or assault) are rooted both in mor
als and in law.
The differing targets, contents, and sources of
rights, and their inevitable conflict, together weave a
tangled web. Notwithstanding all such complications,
this much is clear about rights in general: they are in
every case claims, or potential claims, within a com
munity of moral agents. Rights arise, and can be intel
. ligibly defended, only among beings who actually do,
or can, make moral claims against one another. What
ever else rights may be, therefore, they are necessarily
human; their possessors are persons, human beings.
The attributes of human beings from which this
moral capability arises have been described variously
by philosophers, both ancient and modern: the inner
consciousness of a free will (Saint Augustine3 ); the
grasp, by human reason, of the binding character of
moral law (Saint Thomas4 ); the self-conscious partici
pation of human beings in an objective ethical order
(Hegel5 ); human membership in an organic moral
community (Bradley6 ); the development of the hu-
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man self through the consciousness of other moral
selves (Mead 7 ); and the underivative, intuitive cogni
tion of the rightness of an action (Prichard8 ). Most
influential has been Immanuel Kant's emphasis on
the universal human possession of a uniquely moral
will and the autonomy its use entails. 9 Humans con
front choices that are purely moral; humans - but
certainly not dogs or mice - lay down moral laws, for
others and for themselves. Human beings are self
legislative, morally auto-nomous.
Animals (that is, nonhuman animals, the ordinary
sense of that word) lack this capacity for free moral
judgment. They are not beings of a kind capable of
exercising or responding to moral claims. Animals
therefore have no rights, and they can have none. This
is the core of the argument about the alleged rights
of animals. The holders of rights must have the ca
pacity to comprehend rules of duty, governing all
including themselves. In applying such rules, the
holders of rights must recognize possible conflicts
between what is in their own interest and what is just.
Only in a community of beings capable of self-restrict
ing moral judgments can the concept of a right be
correctly invoked.
Humans have such moral capacities. They are in
this sense self-legislative, are members of communities
governed by moral rules, and do possess rights. Ani
mals do not have such moral capacities. They are not
morally self-legislative, cannot possibly be members
of a truly moral community, and therefore cannot pos
sess rights. In conducting research on animal subjects,
therefore, we do not violate their rights, because they
have none to violate.
To animate life, even in its simplest forms, we give a
certain natural reverence. But the possession of rights
presupposes a moral status not attained by the vast
majority of living things. We must not infer, therefore,
that a live being has, simply in being alive, a "right" to
its life. The assertion that all animals, only because
they are alive and have interests, also possess the
"right to life" 10 is an abuse of that phrase, and wholly
without warrant.
It does not follow from this,.however, that we are
morally free to do anything we please to animals. Cer
tainly not. In our dealings with animals, as in our
dealings with other human beings, we have obliga
tions that do not arise from claims against us based on
rights. Rights entail obligations, but many of the
things one ought to do are in no way tied to another's
entitlement. Rights and obligations are not reciprocals
of one another, and it is a serious mistake to suppose
that they are.
Illustrations are helpful. Obligations may arise
from internal commitments made: physicians have ob
ligations to their patients not grounded merely in their
patients' rights. Teachers have such obligations to
their students, shepherds to their dogs, and cowboys
to their horses. Obligations may arise from differences
of status: adults owe special care when playing with
young children, and children owe special care when
playing with young pets. Obligations may arise from

Oct. 2, 1986

special relationships: the payment of my son's college
tuition is something to which he may have no right,
although it may be my obligation to bear the burden
if I reasonably can; my dog has no right to daily
exercise and veterinary care, but I do have the obliga
tion to provide these things for her. Obligations may
arise from particular acts or circumstances: one may
be obliged to another for a special kindness done,
or obliged to put an animal out of its misery in view
of its condition - although neither the human bene
factor nor the dying animal may have had a claim of
right.
Plainly, the grounds of our obligations to humans
and to animals are manifold and cannot be formulated
simply. Some hold that there is a general obligation to
do no gratuitous harm to sentient creatures (the prin
ciple of nonmaleficence); some hold that there is a
general obligation to do good to sentient creatures
when that is reasonably within one's power ( the prin
ciple of beneficence). In our dealings with animals,
few will deny that we are at least obliged to act hu
manely - that is, to treat them with the decency and
concern that we owe, as sensitive human beings, to
other sentient creatures. To treat animals humanely,
however, is not to treat them as humans or as the
holders of rights.
A common objection, which deserves a response,
may be paraphrased as follows:
If having rights requires being able to make moral claims, to grasp
and apply moral laws, then many humans - the brain-damaged,
the comatose, the senile - who plainly lack those capacities must
be without rights. But that is absurd. This proves [the critic
concludes] that rights do not depend on the presence of moral
capacities. 1•
10

This objection fails; it mistakenly treats an essential
feature of humanity as though it were a screen for
sorting humans. The capacity for moral judgment that
distinguishes humans from animals is not a test to be
administered to human beings one by one. Persons
who are unable, because of some disability, to perform
the full moral functions natural to human beings are
certainly not for that reason ejected from the moral
community. The issue is one of kind. Humans are of
such a kind that they may be the subject of experi
ments only with their voluntary consent. The choices
they make freely must be respected. Animals are of
such a kind that it is impossible for them, in principle,
to give or withhold voluntary consent or to make a
moral choice. What humans retain when disabled,
animals have never had.
A second objection, also often made, may be para
phrased as follows:
Capacities will not succeed in distinguishing humans from the other
animals. Animals also reason; animals also communicate with one
another; animals also care passionately for their young; animals also
exhibit desires and preferences.11• 12 Features of moral relevance rationality, interdependence, and love-are not exhibited uniquely
by human beings. Therefore [this critic concludes], there can be no
solid moral distinction between humans and other animals. 10

This criticism misses the central point. It is not the
ability to communicate or to reason, or dependence on
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one another, or care for the young, or the exhibition of
preference, or any such behavior that marks the criti
cal divide. Analogies between human families and
those of monkeys, or between human communities
and those of wolves, and the like, are entirely beside
the point. Patterns of conduct are not at issue. Ani
mals do indeed exhibit remarkable behavior at times.
Conditioning, fear, instinct, and intelligence all con
tribute to species survival. Membership in a commu
nity of moral agents nevertheless remains impossible
for them. Actors subject to moral judgment must be
capable of grasping the generality of an ethical prem
ise in a practical syllogism. Humans act immorally
often enough, but only they - never wolves or mon
keys - can discern, by applying some moral rule to
the facts of a case, that a given act ought or ought
not to be performed. The moral restraints imposed
by humans on themselves are thus highly abstract
and are often in conflict with the self-interest of
the agent. Communal behavior among animals, even
when most intelligent and most endearing, does not
approach autonomous morality in this fundamental
sense.
Genuinely moral acts have an internal as well as an
external dimension. Thus, in law, an act can be crimi
nal only when the guilty deed, the actus rem;, is done
with a guilty mind, mens rea. No animal can ever
commit a crime; bringing animals to criminal trial is
the mark of primitive ignorance. The claims of moral
right are similarly inapplicable to them. Does a lion
have a right to eat a baby zebra? Does a baby zebra
have a right not to be eaten? Such questions, mis
takenly invoking the concept of right where it does
not belong, do not make good sense. Those who con
demn biomedical research because it violates "animal
rights" commit the same blunder.
IN DEFENSE OF "SPECIESISM"

Abandoning reliance on animal rights, some critics
resort instead to animal sentience - their feelings of
pain and distress. We ought to desist from the imposi
tion of pain insofar as we can. Since all or nearly all
experimentation on animals does- impose pain and
could be readily forgone, say these critics, it should be
stopped. The ends sought may be worthy, but those
ends do not justify imposing agonies on humans, and
by animals the agonies are felt no less. The laboratory
use of animals (these critics conclude) must therefore
be ended - or at least very sharply curtailed.
Argument of this variety is essentially utilitarian,
often expressly so 13 ; it is based on the calculation of
the net product, in pains and pleasures, resulting from
experiments on animals.Jeremy Bentham, comparing
horses and dogs with other sentient creatures, is thus
commonly quoted: "The question is not, Can they
reason? nor Can they talk? but, Can they suffer?" 14
Animals certainly can suffer and surely ought not to
be made to suffer needlessly. But in inferring, from
these uncontroversial premises, that biomedical re
search causing animal distress is largely (or wholly)
wrong, the critic commits two serious errors.

867

The first error is the assumption, often explicitly
defended, that all sentient animals have equal moral
standing. Between a dog and a human being, accord
ing to this view, there is no moral difference; hence the
pains suffered by dogs must be weighed no differently
from the pains suffered by humans. To deny such
equality, according to this critic, is to give unjust pref
erence to one species over another; it is "speciesism."
The most influential statement of this moral equality
of species was made by Peter Singer:
The racist violates the principle of equality by giving greater weight
to the interests of members of his own race when there is a clash
between their interests and the interests of those of another race.
The sexist violates the principle of equality by favoring the interests
of his own sex. Similarly the speciesist allows the interests of his
own species to override the greater interests of members of other
species. The pattern is identical in each case. 2

This argument is worse than unsound; it is atro
cious. It draws an offensive moral conclusion from a
deliberately devised verbal parallelism that is utterly
specious. Racism has no rational ground whatever.
Differing degrees of respect or concern for humans for
no other reason than that they are members of differ
ent races is an injustice totally without foundation in
the nature of the races themselves. Racists, even if
acting on the basis of mistaken factual beliefs, do
grave moral wrong precisely because there is no mor
ally relevant distinction among the races. The suppo
sition of such differences has led to outright horror.
The same is true of the sexes, neither sex being enti
tled by right to greater respect or concern than the
other. No dispute here.
Between species of animate life, however - be
tween (for example) humans on the one hand and cats
or rats on the other - the morally relevant differences
are enormous, and almost universally appreciated.
Humans engage in moral reflection; humans are mor
ally autonomous; humans are members of moral com
munities, recognizing just claims against their own
interest. Human beings do have rights; theirs is a mor
al status very different from that of cats or rats.
I am a speciesist. Speciesism is not merely plausible;
it is essential for right conduct, because those who will
not make the morally relevant distinctions among spe
cies are almost certain, in consequence, to misappre
hend their true obligations. The analogy between spe
ciesism and racism is insidious. Every sensitive moral
judgment requires that the differing natures of the
beings to whom obligations are owed be considered. If
all forms of animate life - or vertebrate animal life?
- must be treated equally, and if therefore in evaluat
ing a research program the pains of a rodent count
equally with the pains of a human, we are forced to
conclude (1) that neither humans nor rodents possess
rights, or (2) that rodents possess all the rights that
humans possess. Both alternatives are absurd. Yet one
or the other must be swallowed if the moral equality of
all species is to be defended.
Humans owe to other humans a degree of moral
regard that cannot be owed to animals. Some humans
take on the obligation to support and heal others, both
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humans and animals, as a principal duty in their lives;
the fulfillment of that duty may require the sacrifice of
many animals. If biomedical investigators abandon
the effective pursuit of their professional objectives
because they are convinced that they may not do to
animals what the service of humans requires, they will
fail, objectively, to do their duty. Refusing to recognize
the moral differences among species is a sure path to
calamity. (The largest animal rights group in the
country is People for the Ethical Treatment of Ani
mals; its codirector, Ingrid Newkirk, calls research
using animal subjects "fascism" and "supremacism. "
"Animal liberationists do not separate out the human
animal," she says, "so there is no rational basis for
saying that a human being has special rights. A rat is a
pig is a dog is a boy. They're all mammals. " 1 5 )
Those who claim to base their objection to the use
of animals in biomedical research on their reckoning
of the net pleasures and pains produced make a sec
ond error, equally grave. Even if it were true - as it is
surely not - that the pains of all animate beings must
be counted equally, a cogent utilitarian calculation
requires that we weigh all the consequences of the use,
and of the nonuse, of animals in laboratory research.
Critics relying (however mistakenly) on animal rights
may claim to ignore the beneficial results of such re
search, rights being trump cards to which interest and
advantage must give way. But an argument that is
explicitly framed in terms of interest and benefit for all
over the long run must attend also to the disadvanta
geous consequences of not using animals in research,
and to all the achievements attained and attainable
only through their use. The sum of the benefits of their
use is utterly beyond quantification. The elimination
of horrible disease, the increase of longevity, the
avoidance of great pain, the saving of lives, and the
improvement of the quality of lives (for humans and
for animals) achieved through research using animals
is so incalculably great that the argument of these
critics, systematically pursued, establishes not their
conclusion but its reverse: to refrain from using ani
mals in biomedical research is, on utilitarian grounds,
morally wrong.
When balancing the pleasures and pains resulting
from the use of animals in research, we must not fail to
place on the scales the terrible pains that would have
resulted, would be suffered now, and would long con
tinue had animals not been used. Every disease elimi
nated, every vaccine developed, every method of pain
relief devised, every surgical procedure invented, ev
ery prosthetic device implanted - indeed, virtually
every modern medical therapy is due, in part or in
whole, to experimentation using animals. Nor may we
ignore, in the balancing process, the predictable gains
in human (and animal) well-being that are probably
achievable in the future but that will not be achieved if
the decision is made now to desist from such research
or to curtail it.
Medical investigators are seldom insensitive to the
distress their work may cause animal subjects. Oppo-

Oct. 2, 1 986

nents of research using animals are frequently insensi
tive to the cruelty of the results of the restrictions they
would impose. 2 Untold numbers of human beings real persons, although not now identifiable - would
suffer grievously as the consequence of this well
meaning but shortsighted tenderness. If the morally
relevant differences between humans and animals are
borne in mind, and if all relevant considerations are
weighed, the calculation of long-term consequences
must give overwhelming support for biomedical re
search using animals.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
Substitution

The humane treatment of animals requires that we
desist from experimenting on them if we can accom
plish the same result using alternative methods - in
vitro experimentation, computer simulation, or oth
ers. Critics of some experiments using animals rightly
make this point.
It would be a serious error to suppose, however,
that alternative techniques could soon be used in most
research now using live animal subjects. No other
methods now on the horizon - or perhaps ever to be
available - can fully replace the testing of a drug, a
procedure, or a vaccine, in live organisms. The flood
of new medical possibilities being opened by the suc
cesses of recombinant DNA technology will turn to a
trickle if testing on live animals is forbidden. When
initial trials entail great risks, there may be no forward
movement whatever without the use of live animal
subjects. In seeking knowledge that may prove critical
in later clinical applications, the unavailability of ani
mals for inquiry may spell complete stymie. In the
United States, federal regulations require the testing
of new drugs and other products on animals, for effica
cy and safety, before human beings are exposed to
them. 1 6 • We would not want it otherwise.
Every advance in medicine - every new drug, new
operation, new therapy of any kind - must sooner or
later be tried on a living being for the first time. That
trial, controlled or uncontrolled, will be an experi
ment. The subject of that experiment, if it is not an
animal, will be a human being. Prohibiting the use of
live animals in biomedical research, therefore, or
sharply restricting it, must result either in the block
age of much valuable research or in the replacement
of animal subjects with human subjects. These are the
consequences - unacceptable to most reasonable per
sons - of not using animals in research.
17

Reduction

Should we not at least reduce the use of animals in
biomedical research? No, we should increase it, to
avoid when feasible the use of humans as experimen
tal subjects. Medical investigations putting human
subjects at some risk are numerous and greatly varied.
The risks run in such experiments are usually un
avoidable, and (thanks to earlier experiments on ani-
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mals) most such risks are minimal or moderate. But
some experimental risks are substantial.
When an experimental protocol that entails sub
stantial risk to humans comes before an institutional
review board, what response is appropriate? The in
vestigation, we may suppose, is promising and de
serves support, so long as its human subjects are pro
tected against unnecessary dangers. May not the
investigators be fairly asked, Have you done all that
you can to eliminate risk to humans by the extensive
testing of that drug, that procedure, or that device on
animals? To achieve maximal safety for humans we
are right to require thorough experimentation on ani
mal subjects before humans are involved.
Opportunities to increase human safety in this way
are commonly missed; trials in which risks may be
shifted from humans to animals are often not devised,
sometimes not even considered. Why? For the investi
gator, the use of animals as subjects is often more
expensive, in money and time, than the use of human
subjects. Access to suitable human subjects is often
quick and convenient, whereas access to appropriate
animal subjects may be awkward, costly, and bur
dened with red tape. Physician-investigators have
often had more experience working with human be
ings and know precisely where the needed pool of sub
jects is to be found and how they may be enlisted.
Animals, and the procedures for their use, are often
less familiar to these investigators . Moreover, the use
of animals in place of humans is now more likely to be
the target of zealous protests from without. The up
shot is that humans are sometimes subjected to risks
that animals could have borne, and should have
borne, in their place. To maximize the protection of
human subjects, I conclude, the wide and imaginative
use of live animal subjects should be encouraged rath
er than discouraged. This enlargement in the use of
animals is our obligation.
Consistency

Finally, inconsistency between the profession and
the practice of many who oppose research using ani
mals deserves comment. This frankly ad hominem ob
servation aims chiefly to show that a coherent position
rejecting the use of animals in medical research im
poses costs so high as to be intolerable even to the
critics themselves.
One cannot coherently object to the killing of ani
mals in biomedical investigations while continuing to
eat them. Anesthetics and thoughtful animal hus
bandry render the level of actual animal distress in the
laboratory generally lower than that in the abattoir.
So long as death and discomfort do not substantially
differ in the two contexts, the consistent objector must
not only refrain from all eating of animals but also
protest as vehemently against others eating them as
against others experimenting on them. No less vigor
ously must the critic object to the wearing of animal
hides in coats and shoes, to employment in any indus
trial enterprise that uses animal parts, and to any
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commercial development that will cause death or dis
tress to animals .
Killing animals to meet human needs for food,
clothing, and shelter is judged entirely reasonable by
most persons. The ubiquity of these uses and the vir
tual universality of moral support for them confront
the opponent of research using animals with an in
escapable difficulty. How can the many common uses
of animals be judged morally worthy, while their use
in scientific investigation is judged unworthy?
The number of animals used in research is but the
tiniest fraction of the total used to satisfy assorted
human appetites. That these appetites, often base and
satisfiable in other ways, morally j ustify the far larger
consumption of animals, whereas the quest for im
proved human health and understanding cannot justi
fy the far smaller, is wholly implausible. Aside from
the numbers of animals involved, the distinction in
terms of worthiness of use, drawn with regard to any
single animal, is not defensible. A given sheep is surely
not more justifiably used to put lamb chops on the
supermarket counter than to serve in testing a new
contraceptive or a new prosthetic device. The need
less killing of animals is wrong; if the common kill
ing of them for our food or convenience is right, the
less common but more humane uses of animals in
the service of medical science are certainly not less
right.
Scrupulous vegetarianism, in matters of food, cloth
ing, shelter, commerce, and recreation, and in all oth
er spheres, is the only fully coherent position the critic
may adopt. At great human cost, the lives of fish and
crustaceans must also be protected, with equal vigor,
if speciesism has been forsworn. A very few consistent
critics adopt this position. It is the reductio ad absur
dum of the rejection of moral distinctions between
animals and human beings.
Opposition to the use of animals in research is
based on arguments of two different kinds - those
relying on the alleged rights of anirri.als and those rely
ing on the consequences for animals. I have argued
that arguments of both kinds must fail. We surely do
have obligations to animals, but they have, and can
have, no rights against us on which research can in
fringe. In calculating the consequences of animal re
search, we must weigh all the long-term benefits of the
results achieved - to animals and to humans - and
in that calculation we must not assume the moral
equality of all animate species.
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MEDICAL INTELLIGENCE

methylatropine nitrate), and antiallergic and anti
inflammatory drugs (cromolyn and various steroids)
are now available as aerosols and are frequently able
(alone or in combination) to control all but the most
severe cases of chronic asthma, without the addition
of oral medication. 3 • 6
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HYSICIANS have been intrigued with the idea of
inhalation therapy for more than a century, since
patients were advised to smoke cigarettes containing
anticholinergic botanicals such as Datura stramonium to
obtain relief from asthma attacks. 1
The use of aerosols to treat asthma allows an almost
ideal therapeutic ratio to be achieved, since minute
doses of inhaled medication provide optimal mainte
nance therapy with minimal side effects.2•6 In severe
acute asthma, sympathomimetic bronchodilator aero
sols are superior to systemic therapy with the same
agents. 7 •8 In chronic asthma, adrenoceptor-agonist
aerosols provide greater and more rapid bronchodila
tation and are also more effective in preventing air
way responses to exercise and histamine than the oral
form of the same medications. 9- 1 2 Although sympa
thomimetic aerosols are more effective than oral or
intravenous medications, they cause much less trem
or, tachycardia, palpitations, and anxiety {which are
commonly experienced with the oral or intravenous
therapy) .7, I 3 , I 4 Similarly, inhaled topically potent ste
roids have been shown to act effectively in the pro
phylactic management of moderately severe asthma,
without causing the serious complications of long
term treatment with systemic steroids.6 A variety of
relatively selective �2-sympathomimetic agents (albu
terol, fenoterol, terbutaline, and bitolterol), anticho
linergic bronchodilators {ipratropium bromide and
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AND DELIVERY

Therapeutic aerosols used in the treatment of re
versible airflow obstruction may be produced either
by metered-dose inhalers, which provide unit doses of
medication from fluorocarbon-pressurized canisters or
from capsules, or by continuously or intermittently
generated wet aerosols from ultrasonic or jet nebu
lizers that contain drug solutions {which patients usu
ally inhale by tidal breathing). Devices for intermit
tent positive-pressure breathing are now rarely used to
deliver therapeutic aerosols except to patients with
respiratory failure who need assisted ventilation.
The deposition of aerosol in the lower respiratory
tract is a function of inertial impaction and sedi
mentation due to gravity. These processes depend
in turn on the size of the aerosol 1 5 , I 6 and the respira
tory variables - namely, inspiratory flow rate, fre
quency, tidal volume, breath-holding time, 1 7· 2 0 and
airway caliber. I 6, 2 1 , 22 Aerosol generators used for thera
peutic purposes produce aerosol particles that are
0.5 to 35 µm in diameter. 23 • 24 However, only parti
cles with aerodynamic diameters of I to 5 µm are
efficiently deposited in the lower respiratory tract 1 5 ;
these represent, even under optimal inhalation condi
tions, only 1 3 percent of the output from a metered
dose inhaler 1 7 and only l to 5 percent of that from
most nebulizers. 4• 2 3 Increased inspiratory flow rates,
as in patients with acute asthma, result in increased
losses because of impaction of the aerosol particles in
the upper airway and at the bifurcations of the first
few bronchial divisions. 1 9 When inspiratory flow rates
are maintained below l liter per second, deposition of
particles with diameters of I to 5 µm in the pulmonary
airways is increased 1 7 and bronchodilatation is en
hanced. 25 Furthermore, because particles with diame
ters less than 5 µm need up to two seconds to settle
onto the walls of terminal bronchioles and much long
er in central airways, 1 6 breath-holding for about 1 0
seconds after inhalation of the aerosol will also result
in increased deposition of the aerosol and improved

